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Dialectical Jurisprudence: Aristotle and the Concept of Law


John T. Valauri


Northern Kentucky University - Salmon P. Chase College of Law

August 16, 2010


Abstract:     
This article offers a therapy for modern analytic legal philosophy’s bipolar disorder, a disorder manifested in the tendency to approach and analyze philosophical topics as dueling dichotomies, incapable of resolution or reconciliation. The upshot of this situation has been the division of Anglo-American legal philosophy into two warring camps – positivist and non-positivist. Through an examination of puzzles involving conceptual analysis and legal rules, this article suggests a dialectical alternative to the bipolar disorder, an alternative inspired by Aristotle’s practical philosophy. This dialectical jurisprudence seeks to change the pursuit of the nature of law from a search for necessary and sufficient conditions to an illumination of the continuities between important elements of law.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 52

Keywords: conceptual analysis, Hart, Dworkin, postivism, rules, Aristotle

JEL Classification: K10

working papers series


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Date posted: August 16, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Valauri, John T., Dialectical Jurisprudence: Aristotle and the Concept of Law (August 16, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1659924 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1659924

Contact Information

John T. Valauri (Contact Author)
Northern Kentucky University - Salmon P. Chase College of Law ( email )
Nunn Hall
Highland Heights, KY 41099
United States
859-572-5387 (Phone)
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