Dialectical Jurisprudence: Aristotle and the Concept of Law
John T. Valauri
Northern Kentucky University - Salmon P. Chase College of Law
August 16, 2010
This article offers a therapy for modern analytic legal philosophy’s bipolar disorder, a disorder manifested in the tendency to approach and analyze philosophical topics as dueling dichotomies, incapable of resolution or reconciliation. The upshot of this situation has been the division of Anglo-American legal philosophy into two warring camps – positivist and non-positivist. Through an examination of puzzles involving conceptual analysis and legal rules, this article suggests a dialectical alternative to the bipolar disorder, an alternative inspired by Aristotle’s practical philosophy. This dialectical jurisprudence seeks to change the pursuit of the nature of law from a search for necessary and sufficient conditions to an illumination of the continuities between important elements of law.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 52
Keywords: conceptual analysis, Hart, Dworkin, postivism, rules, Aristotle
JEL Classification: K10working papers series
Date posted: August 16, 2010
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