Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=166096
 
 

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Managerial Horizons, Accounting Choices and Informativeness of Earnings


Albert L. Nagy


John Carroll University

Kathleen Blackburn Norris


University of Tennessee

Richard A. Riley Jr.


West Virginia University - Department of Accounting and Management Information Systems



Abstract:     
Prior research has demonstrated that in companies with low managerial ownership managers exploit the latitude available in generally accepted accounting principles to alleviate contractual constraints, presumably to ensure job preservation (annual salary) and maximize incentive compensation (annual bonus). The result is accounting information that is less informative in low managerial ownership companies compared to companies with higher levels of managerial ownership. We hypothesize that in companies with low managerial ownership, higher levels of stock ownership relative to annual salary and bonus (i.e., the ratio of the market value of managerial ownership to annual compensation) mitigate managerial incentives to exploit accounting choices. Our findings are consistent with this hypothesis and suggest that greater managerial wealth tied to the long-term performance of the company through stock ownership versus short-term performance horizons (annual salary and bonus) results in more informative accounting earnings and lower discretionary accounting accrual adjustments in low managerial ownership companies.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 32

JEL Classification: M41, M43, J33

working papers series


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Date posted: May 28, 1999  

Suggested Citation

Nagy, Albert L. and Norris, Kathleen Blackburn and Riley, Richard A., Managerial Horizons, Accounting Choices and Informativeness of Earnings. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=166096 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.166096

Contact Information

Albert L. Nagy
John Carroll University ( email )
School of Business 20700 North Park Boulevard
Cleveland, OH 44118
216-397-4393 (Phone)
216-397-3063 (Fax)
Kathleen Blackburn Norris
University of Tennessee ( email )
College of Business Administration 916 Volunteer Boulevard
Knoxville, TN 37996
United States
423-974-1754 (Phone)
423-974-4631 (Fax)
Richard A. Riley Jr. (Contact Author)
West Virginia University - Department of Accounting and Management Information Systems ( email )
Morgantown, WV 26506
United States
304-293-7849 (Phone)
304-293-0635 (Fax)
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