Seniority and Incumbency in Legislatures

25 Pages Posted: 21 Aug 2010

See all articles by Abhinay Muthoo

Abhinay Muthoo

University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Kenneth Shepsle

Harvard University - Department of Government

Date Written: July 28, 2010

Abstract

In this paper we elaborate on a strategic view of institutional features. Our focus is on seniority, though we note that this general approach may also be deployed to understand other aspects of institutional arrangements. We have taken the initial game-theoretic model of seniority of McKelvey and Riezman (1992), simplified it in order to characterize its fundamental implications, generalized these results in several ways, and extended the model by deriving additional implications.

The broad messages of our paper, articulated by McKelvey and Riezman as well, are two. First, the endogenous choice of institutional features like seniority by self-governing groups is strategic. While the fine-grained ways of doing things in an institutional context surely serve internal functional objectives, these are not the only objectives. Agents making choices on how to govern themselves have private motivations - in the case of elected politicians they often revolve around reelection.

This leads to our second broad message. The institutions through which self-governing groups conduct their business do not exist in a vacuum. They are embedded in a broader context. Those offering functional explanations for various institutional features overlook this. Particular institutional arrangements have effects \textit{outside} the governance institution itself. These effects, in principle, could be accidental by-products. Our strategic approach, however, argues that they may well be the primary reasons for a practice being instituted.

Suggested Citation

Muthoo, Abhinay and Shepsle, Kenneth, Seniority and Incumbency in Legislatures (July 28, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1661013 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1661013

Abhinay Muthoo

University of Warwick - Department of Economics ( email )

Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom

Kenneth Shepsle (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Government ( email )

1737 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
(617) 495-4928 (Phone)
(617) 496-5149 (Fax)

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