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Incentives, Resources and the Organization of the School System


Facundo Albornoz


University of Birmingham

Samuel Berlinski


Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) - Research Department

Antonio Cabrales


Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

August 2010

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7964

Abstract:     
We study a model where student e ort and talent interact with parental and teachers' investments, as well as with school system resources. The model is rich, yet sufficiently stylized to provide novel implications. We can show, for example, that an improvement in parental outside options will reduce parental and school effort, which are partially compensated through school resources. In this way we provide a rationale for the ambiguous existing empirical evidence on the effect of school resources. We also provide a novel microfoundation for peer effects, with empirical implications on welfare and on preferences for sorting across schools.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

Keywords: education, parental effort, school resources

JEL Classification: I20, I21, I28

working papers series


Date posted: August 24, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Albornoz, Facundo, Berlinski, Samuel and Cabrales, Antonio, Incentives, Resources and the Organization of the School System (August 2010). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7964. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1661567

Contact Information

Facundo Albornoz (Contact Author)
University of Birmingham ( email )
Birmingham, B15 2TT
United Kingdom
Samuel Berlinski
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) - Research Department ( email )
1300 New York Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20577
United States
Antonio Cabrales
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid ( email )
CL. de Madrid 126
Madrid, Madrid 28903
Spain
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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