Abstract

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Trading-Off Reproductive Technology and Adoption: Does Subsidizing IVF Decrease Adoption Rates and Should it Matter?


I. Glenn Cohen


Harvard Law School

Daniel L. Chen


ETH Zurich - Center for Law and Economics

August 24, 2010

Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 95, p. 485, 2010
Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 11-03

Abstract:     
For those facing infertility, using assisted reproductive technology to have genetically related children is a very expensive proposition. In particular, to produce a live birth through in vitro fertilization (IVF) will cost an individual (on average) between $66,667 and $114,286 in the U.S. If forced to pay these prices out of pocket, many would be unable to afford this technology. Given this reality, a number of states have attempted to improve access to reproductive technology through state-level insurance mandates that cover IVF. Several scholars, however, have worried that increasing access in this way will cause a diminution in adoptions and have argued against enactment of state mandates for that reason.

In this paper, which was selected for presentation at the 2010 Stanford-Yale Junior Faculty Forum, we push against that conclusion on two fronts.

First, we interrogate the normative premises of the argument and expose its contestable implicit assumptions about how the state should balance the interests of existing children waiting for adoption and those seeking access to reproductive technology in order to have genetically related children.

Second, we investigate the unexamined empirical question behind the conclusion: does state subsidization of reproductive technologies through insurance mandates actually reduce adoption; that is, is there a trade-off between helping individuals conceive and helping children waiting to be adopted? We call the claim that there is such an effect the “substitution theory.” Using the differential timing of introduction of state-level insurance mandates relating to IVF in some states and differences in the forms these mandates take, we employ several different econometric techniques (differences-in-differences, ordinary least squares, two-stage least squares) to examine the effect of these mandates on IVF utilization and adoption. Contrary to the assumption of the substitution theory, we find no strong evidence that state support of IVF through these mandates crowds out either domestic or international adoption.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 94

Keywords: Reproductive Technology, Adoption, Family Law, Bioethics, Econometrics

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Date posted: August 24, 2010 ; Last revised: July 13, 2014

Suggested Citation

Cohen, I. Glenn and Chen, Daniel L., Trading-Off Reproductive Technology and Adoption: Does Subsidizing IVF Decrease Adoption Rates and Should it Matter? (August 24, 2010). Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 95, p. 485, 2010; Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 11-03. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1664501

Contact Information

I. Glenn Cohen (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
1525 Massachusetts Avenue
Griswold Hall 503
Cambridge, 02138
United States
Daniel L. Chen
ETH Zurich - Center for Law and Economics ( email )
Haldeneggsteig 4
D-GESS IFW E 44
8092 Zurich, CH-1015
Switzerland
41 44 632 4462 (Phone)
41 44 632 10 97 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.dlchen.ethz.ch
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