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The Alliance Formation Puzzle and Capacity Constraints


Kai A. Konrad


Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Dan Kovenock


Chapman University - Economic Science Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
February 1, 2008

WZB Markets and Politics Working Paper No. SP II 2008-07

Abstract:     
The formation of an alliance in conflict situations is known to suffer from a collective action problem and from the potential of internal conflict. We show that budget constraints of an intermediate size can overcome this strong disadvantage and explain the formation of alliances.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 9

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Date posted: August 26, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Konrad, Kai A. and Kovenock, Dan J, The Alliance Formation Puzzle and Capacity Constraints (February 1, 2008). WZB Markets and Politics Working Paper No. SP II 2008-07. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1664990 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1664990

Contact Information

Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )
Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm
Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) ( email )
Reichpietschufer 50
Berlin, 10785
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.wzb.eu/mp/fff/people/kai_konrad.en.htm
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London, EC1V 7RR
United Kingdom
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 81679
Germany
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, 53072
Germany
Daniel J Kovenock
Chapman University - Economic Science Institute ( email )
One University Dr.
Orange, CA 92866
United States
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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