Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1666111
 


 



Leniency Programs in the Presence of Judicial Errors


Nahom Tesfay Ghebrihiwet


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Evgenia Motchenkova


VU University Amsterdam - Department of Economics; TILEC

August 26, 2010

TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2010-030

Abstract:     
We analyze the effects of antitrust and leniency programs in a repeated oligopoly model outlined in Motta and Polo (2003). We extend their framework by including the possibility of Type I judicial errors and pre-trial settlements. Through comparison of our results to the earlier results we come to a number of novel conclusions. Firstly, antitrust enforcement in the presence of judicial errors is less effective and ex-ante deterrence is weaker than was predicted by Motta and Polo (2003). Secondly, adverse effects of leniency programs are underestimated by the traditional approach, which does not take Type I judicial errors into account.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: Collusion, Antitrust, Self-reporting, Judicial Errors, Repeated Game

JEL Classification: K21, L41, C72

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: August 27, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Tesfay Ghebrihiwet, Nahom and Motchenkova, Evgenia, Leniency Programs in the Presence of Judicial Errors (August 26, 2010). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2010-030. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1666111 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1666111

Contact Information

Nahom Tesfay Ghebrihiwet
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Evgenia Motchenkova (Contact Author)
VU University Amsterdam - Department of Economics ( email )
De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
Netherlands
TILEC ( email )
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,621
Downloads: 114
Download Rank: 144,982

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.391 seconds