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Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical Framework


Steven L. Schwarcz


Duke University - School of Law

Iman Anabtawi


University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law

January 3, 2011

UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 10-11

Abstract:     
Systemic risk management is at the forefront of financial regulatory agendas worldwide. The global financial crisis was a powerful demonstration of the inability and unwillingness of financial market participants to carry out the task of safeguarding the stability of the financial system. It also highlighted the enormous direct and indirect costs of addressing systemic crises after they have occurred, as opposed to attempting to prevent them from arising. Governments and international organizations are responding with measures intended to make the financial system more resilient to economic shocks, many of which will be implemented by regulatory bodies over time. These measures suffer, however, from the lack of a theoretical account of how systemic risk propagates within the financial system and why regulatory intervention is needed to disrupt it. In this Article, we address this deficiency by examining how systemic risk is transmitted. We then proceed to explain why, in the absence of regulation, market participants are poorly situated to disrupt the transmission of systemic risk. Finally, we advance a regulatory framework for correcting that market failure.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 63

Keywords: financial markets, systemic risk, financial crisis

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Date posted: September 1, 2010 ; Last revised: January 6, 2011

Suggested Citation

Schwarcz, Steven L. and Anabtawi, Iman, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical Framework (January 3, 2011). UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 10-11. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1670017 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1670017

Contact Information

Steven L. Schwarcz (Contact Author)
Duke University - School of Law ( email )
210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-613-7060 (Phone)
919-613-7231 (Fax)
Iman Anabtawi
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )
385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States
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