Executive Turnover Following Option Backdating Allegations
University of Texas at Arlington
University of Texas at Dallas
Penn State Great Valley
Edward P. Swanson
Texas A&M University - Mays Business School; Mays Business School, Texas A&M University
June 22, 2012
The Accounting Review (January 2013): 75-105.
We find the likelihood of forced turnover in the CEO and CFO positions is significantly higher in the aftermath of option backdating than in propensity-score-matched control firms. Forced turnover occurs in about 36 percent of the accused firms. The forced turnover rates for CEOs and CFOs are similar and several times higher than normal. The displaced managers are further punished by the managerial labor market, as they are much less likely than control firm managers to be rehired at comparable positions. We also find that backdating firms restructure CEO compensation to rely less on stock options. Finally, we learn the higher turnover extends to the General Counsel. While boards are often viewed as unresponsive to criticisms involving executive compensation, they did respond quite decisively to option backdating allegations and the accompanying adverse publicity.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 52
Keywords: Stock Option Compensation, Option Backdating, Executive Turnover, Corporate Governance
JEL Classification: M41
Date posted: September 1, 2010 ; Last revised: May 30, 2014
© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 1.531 seconds