CEO Compensation and Board Structure Revisited
College of William and Mary - Mason School of Business
May 6, 2009
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) estimate that CEO pay decreases by 17% more in firms whose boards were not compliant with the recent NYSE/NASDAQ independence requirements than in firms that were compliant. We document that 65% of the magnitude is driven by a single outlier. All our attempts to improve the estimate – by (i) correcting classification errors in board compliance; (ii) adding firms to the sample that satisfy the sample selection criteria; and (iii) differentiating by the presence of substitute governance mechanisms – further weaken the result. We conclude that board independence has no effect on the level of CEO pay.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 22
Keywords: CEO pay, executive compensation, managerial power, board independence, board structure, Sarbanes-Oxley, NYSE, Nasdaq
JEL Classification: G34, G38, J33, J38working papers series
Date posted: September 7, 2010
© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.454 seconds