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A Primary Cause of Partisanship? Nomination Systems and Legislator IdeologyEric McGheePublic Policy Institute of California Seth E. MasketUniversity of Denver Boris ShorUniversity of Chicago - Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies Steven RogersPrinceton University - Department of Politics Nolan M. McCartyPrinceton University - Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs May 1, 2013 Abstract: Many theoretical and empirical accounts of representation argue that primary elections are a polarizing influence. Likewise, many reformers advocate opening party nominations to non-members as a way of increasing the number of moderate elected officials. Data and measurement constraints, however, have limited the range of empirical tests of this argument. We marry a unique new data set of state legislator ideal points to a detailed accounting of primary systems in the United States to gauge the effect of primary systems on polarization. We find that the openness of a primary election has little, if any, effect on the extremity of the politicians it produces.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 48 Keywords: State legislatures, polarization, primaries, American politics, partisanship working papers seriesDate posted: September 9, 2010 ; Last revised: May 3, 2013Suggested CitationContact Information
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