Nonsequential Search Equilibrium with Search Cost Heterogeneity
José Luis Moraga-González
University of Navarra, IESE Business School; University of Groningen
University of Groningen
Matthijs R. Wildenbeest
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy
July 1, 2010
IESE Business School Working Paper No. 869
We generalize the model of Burdett and Judd (1983) to the case where an arbitrary finite number of firms sells a homogeneous good to buyers who have heterogeneous search costs. We show that a price dispersed symmetric Nash equilibrium always exists. Numerical results show that the behavior of prices with respect to the number of firms hinges upon the shape of the search cost distribution: when search costs are relatively concentrated (dispersed), entry of firms leads to higher (lower) average prices.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 20
Keywords: nonsequential search, oligopoly, arbitrary search cost distributions
JEL Classification: D43, C72working papers series
Date posted: September 10, 2010
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