Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1674470
 
 

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Overlapping Jurisdictions, Proprietary Communities, and Competition in the Realm of Law


Edward Peter Stringham


Trinity College; Texas Tech University - Rawls College of Business

2006

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 162, No. 3, pp. 516-534, September 2006

Abstract:     
FREY [2001] and others propose subjecting governments to competition within their jurisdiction, but classical liberals argue that having competing law enforcers cannot work. This article describes a hybrid system that relies on markets but has one law enforcement agency per region, with profit motivated proprietors policing their properties. Vertically integrated proprietary communities wishing to attract customers would need to police their property in a way that patrons desire. Although a monopoly on the use of force would exist, bundling law with real estate makes the law enforcer the residual claimant and creates incentives for them to not to expropriate their clientele.

JEL Classification: D740, H100. K400, L330


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Date posted: September 10, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Stringham, Edward Peter, Overlapping Jurisdictions, Proprietary Communities, and Competition in the Realm of Law (2006). Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 162, No. 3, pp. 516-534, September 2006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1674470

Contact Information

Edward Peter Stringham (Contact Author)
Trinity College ( email )
300 Summit Street
Hartford, CT 06106
United States
Texas Tech University - Rawls College of Business ( email )
Lubbock, TX 79409
United States
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