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The Fallacy of Regulatory Symmetry: An Economic Analysis of the 'Level Playing Field' in Cable TV Franchising StatutesThomas W. HazlettGeorge Mason University Dept. of Economics and School of Law George S. FordPhoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies 2001 Business and Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 21-46, 2001 Abstract: Formal regulatory parity can entail counterintuitive effects. In a series of state statutes, municipal governments have been directed to issue cable TV franchises to new competitors only after (a) formal hearings considering the ‘public interest’ in competition; and (b) imposing terms and conditions which are at least as burdensome as those contained in the incumbent’s franchise. While billed as ‘level playing field’ laws, economic theory, an important case study in Connecticut, and a probit analysis of Ameritech’s cable franchise acquisition strategy suggest that these statutes actually tilt the field against entrants.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 26 Keywords: Level Playing Field, Cable TV, Television, Franchising, Entry Deterrence JEL Classification: L5 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: September 10, 2010Suggested CitationContact Information
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