Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1674533
 
 

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The Fallacy of Regulatory Symmetry: An Economic Analysis of the 'Level Playing Field' in Cable TV Franchising Statutes


Thomas W. Hazlett


George Mason University Dept. of Economics and School of Law

George S. Ford


Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies

2001

Business and Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 21-46, 2001

Abstract:     
Formal regulatory parity can entail counterintuitive effects. In a series of state statutes, municipal governments have been directed to issue cable TV franchises to new competitors only after (a) formal hearings considering the ‘public interest’ in competition; and (b) imposing terms and conditions which are at least as burdensome as those contained in the incumbent’s franchise. While billed as ‘level playing field’ laws, economic theory, an important case study in Connecticut, and a probit analysis of Ameritech’s cable franchise acquisition strategy suggest that these statutes actually tilt the field against entrants.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: Level Playing Field, Cable TV, Television, Franchising, Entry Deterrence

JEL Classification: L5

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Date posted: September 10, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Hazlett, Thomas W. and Ford, George S., The Fallacy of Regulatory Symmetry: An Economic Analysis of the 'Level Playing Field' in Cable TV Franchising Statutes (2001). Business and Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 21-46, 2001. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1674533

Contact Information

Thomas W. Hazlett
George Mason University Dept. of Economics and School of Law ( email )
George Mason School of Law
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
703-993-4244 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://mason.gmu.edu/~thazlett/

George Mason Law School Logo

George S. Ford (Contact Author)
Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies ( email )
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 440
Washington, DC 20015
United States
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