Download This PaperNon-Revelation Mechanisms in Many-to-One Markets
24 Pages Posted: 11 Sep 2010 Last revised: 5 Aug 2013
Date Written: August 5, 2013
Abstract
In this study we present a simple mechanism in a many-to-one matching market where multiple costless applications are allowed. The mechanism is based on the principles of eligibility and priority and it implements the set of stable matchings in Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. We extend the analysis to a symmetric mechanism where colleges and students interchange their roles. This mechanism also implements the set of stable matchings.
JEL Classification: C78, D78
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Romero-Medina, Antonio and Triossi Verondini, Matteo Maria, Non-Revelation Mechanisms in Many-to-One Markets (August 5, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1675222 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1675222
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