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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1676253
 
 

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The Emergence of the London Stock Exchange as a Self-Policing Club


Edward Peter Stringham


Trinity College; Texas Tech University - Rawls College of Business

2002

Journal of Private Enterprise, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 1-19, Spring 2002

Abstract:     
In the early stock market in London there were substantial risks of non-payment and fraud. (Mortimer, 1801) According to Hobbesian theory, we would expect stock markets to develop only after government has implemented rules and regulations to eliminate these problems. The historical account, however, provides evidence that solutions to these problems did not come from the state. This article outlines the emergence of the London Stock Exchange, which was created by eighteenth century brokers who transformed coffeehouses into private clubs that created and enforced rules. Rather than relying on public regulation to enforce contracts and reduce fraud, brokers consciously found a way to solve their dilemmas by forming a self-policing club.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17


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Date posted: September 16, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Stringham, Edward Peter, The Emergence of the London Stock Exchange as a Self-Policing Club (2002). Journal of Private Enterprise, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 1-19, Spring 2002. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1676253

Contact Information

Edward Peter Stringham (Contact Author)
Trinity College ( email )
300 Summit Street
Hartford, CT 06106
United States
Texas Tech University - Rawls College of Business ( email )
Lubbock, TX 79409
United States
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