Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1677720
 
 

References (13)



 
 

Citations (3)



 


 



Airport Privatization and International Competition


Toshihiro Matsumura


University of Tokyo - Institute of Social Science

Noriaki Matsushima


Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research

September 11, 2010

ISER Discussion Paper No. 792

Abstract:     
We provide a simple theoretical model to explain the mechanism whereby privatization of international airports can improve welfare. The model consists of a downstream (airline) duopoly with two inputs (landings at two airports) and two types of consumers. The airline companies compete internationally. Using the simple international duopoly model, we show that the outcome where both airports are privatized is always an equilibrium while that where no airport is privatized is another equilibrium only if the degree of product differentiation is large.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 18

Keywords: Airline, Airport, Privatization, International competition, Vertica lrelations

JEL Classification: L33, L13, R48

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: September 17, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Matsumura, Toshihiro and Matsushima, Noriaki, Airport Privatization and International Competition (September 11, 2010). ISER Discussion Paper No. 792. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1677720 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1677720

Contact Information

Toshihiro Matsumura
University of Tokyo - Institute of Social Science ( email )
Hongo 7-3-1
Tokyo, TOKYO 113-0033
Japan
Noriaki Matsushima (Contact Author)
Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research ( email )
6-1 Mihogaoka
Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047
Japan
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 500
Downloads: 82
Download Rank: 182,551
References:  13
Citations:  3

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.313 seconds