Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1678028
 
 

References (52)



 
 

Citations (3)



 


 



Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in Financial Markets


John Armour


University of Oxford - Faculty of Law; University of Oxford - Said Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Colin Mayer


University of Oxford - Said Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); University of Oxford - Said Business School

Andrea Polo


Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)

October 2, 2015

Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 62/2010
ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 300/2010

Abstract:     
We study the impact of the enforcement of financial regulation by the UK’s regulatory authorities on the market price of penalized firms. Existing studies rely on analyses of multiple events that may distort the measurement of reputational losses. In the UK, the entire enforcement process involves only one public announcement and is accompanied by complete information on legal penalties. We find that reputational losses are nearly nine times the size of fines, and are associated with misconduct harming customers or investors, but not third parties.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: Regulation, Reputation, Enforcement, Corporate Law, Financial Regulation

JEL Classification: G28, G38, K22, K42, L51


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Date posted: September 16, 2010 ; Last revised: December 18, 2015

Suggested Citation

Armour, John and Mayer, Colin and Polo, Andrea, Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in Financial Markets (October 2, 2015). Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 62/2010; ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 300/2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1678028 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1678028

Contact Information

John Armour (Contact Author)
University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )
Oriel College
Oxford, OX1 4EW
United Kingdom
+44 1865 286544 (Phone)
University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email )
Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Colin Mayer
University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email ) ( email )
Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
+44 1865 288112 (Phone)
+44 1865 288805 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
University of Oxford - Said Business School ( email ) ( email )
Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain
+44 1865 288112 (Phone)
+44 1865 288805 (Fax)
Andrea Polo
Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain
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