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Analyzing the Polluter Pays Principle Through Law and Economics


Boris N. Mamlyuk


University of Memphis - Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law

September 19, 2010

Southeastern Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 18, No. 1, p. 43, 2010

Abstract:     
This essay is divided into several parts. Part II outlines the basic concept of the polluter pays principle and its economic rationale. Part II then critiques the important conceptual and practical weaknesses of the polluter pays principle. Part III analyzes Ronald Coase’s and Guido Calabresi’s systems for dealing with pollution and nuisance problems. Part IV analyzes the workability of the Coase and Calabresi models and discusses whether those paradigms may be reconciled with the polluter pays principle. Finally, Part V suggests an alternative environmental regulation scheme based on economic considerations that are radically different from current mainstream economic models.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: Polluter Pays Principle, Stern Review, International Environmental Law, Environmental Economics, Environmental Law and Economics, Eco-Criticism

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Date posted: September 19, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Mamlyuk, Boris N., Analyzing the Polluter Pays Principle Through Law and Economics (September 19, 2010). Southeastern Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 18, No. 1, p. 43, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1679245

Contact Information

Boris N. Mamlyuk (Contact Author)
University of Memphis - Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law ( email )
1 Front Street
Memphis, TN 38103-2189
United States
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