Bank Risk-Taking, Securitization, Supervision and Low Interest Rates: Evidence from the Euro Area and the U.S. Lending Standards
European Central Bank (ECB)
Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics
September 20, 2010
ECB Working Paper No. 1248
Using a unique dataset of the Euro area and the U.S. bank lending standards, we find that low (monetary policy) short-term interest rates soften standards, for household and corporate loans. This softening – especially for mortgages – is amplified by securitization activity, weak supervision for bank capital and too low for too long monetary policy rates. Conversely, low long-term interest rates do not soften lending standards. Finally, countries with softer lending standards before the crisis related to negative Taylor-rule residuals experienced a worse economic performance afterwards. These results help shed light on the origins of the crisis and have important policy implications.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 56
Keywords: lending standards, monetary policy, securitization, bank capital, financial stability
JEL Classification: G01, G21, G28, E44, E5working papers series
Date posted: October 5, 2010
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