Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=168008
 


 



A Reply to Alan Schwartz's 'A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy'


Lynn M. LoPucki


University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law


Yale Law Journal, Vol. 109, No. 2, November 1999

Abstract:     
In his 1998 article, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 Yale Law Journal 1807, Alan Schwartz presented a model and proof purporting to show that contractual bankruptcy was superior to the state-supplied mandatory regime. This reply shows the proof to be incorrect on its assumptions in several respects. The reply also presents empirical evidence on the pattern of actual bankruptcy contracting. That evidence suggests that bankruptcy contracting is motivated principally by redistributional rather than efficiency concerns.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

JEL Classification: K12, K29, K39

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: February 8, 2005  

Suggested Citation

LoPucki, Lynn M., A Reply to Alan Schwartz's 'A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy'. Yale Law Journal, Vol. 109, No. 2, November 1999. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=168008

Contact Information

Lynn M. LoPucki (Contact Author)
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )
385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States
(310) 794-5722 (Phone)
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