Abstract

  


 



N-Person Nonconvex Bargaining: Efficient Proportional Solutions


Jens Leth Hougaard


University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics

Mich Tvede


University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics
September 21, 2010

University of Copenhagen Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 10-21

Abstract:     
For n-person bargaining problems the family of proportional solutions (introduced and characterized by Kalai) is generalized to bargaining problems with non-convex payoff sets. The so-called “efficient proportional solutions”are characterized axiomatically using natural extensions of the original axioms provided by Kalai.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 10

Keywords: n-person, non-convex bargaining, proportional solutions, egalitarian solution

JEL Classification: C78

working papers series


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Date posted: September 23, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Hougaard, Jens Leth Leth and Tvede, Mich Palle, N-Person Nonconvex Bargaining: Efficient Proportional Solutions (September 21, 2010). University of Copenhagen Department of Economics Discussion Paper No. 10-21. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1680365 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1680365

Contact Information

Jens Leth Hougaard
University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )
Copenhagen University Library
Licenssekretariatet Nørre Alle 49
DK-2200 Copenhagen N.
Denmark
Mich Palle Tvede (Contact Author)
University of Copenhagen - Department of Economics ( email )
Copenhagen University Library
Licenssekretariatet Nørre Alle 49
DK-2200 Copenhagen N.
Denmark
45 35 32 30 92 (Phone)
45 35 32 30 85 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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