Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1680476
 
 

Citations (16)



 


 



CEO Compensation and Board Structure Revisited


Katherine Guthrie


College of William and Mary - Mason School of Business

Jan Sokolowsky


Independent

Kam-Ming Wan


Hong Kong Polytechnic University

September 18, 2010

Journal of Finance, Vol. 67, No. 3, pp. 1149-1168, June 2012

Abstract:     
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (JF, 2009) estimate that CEO pay decreases by 17% more in firms that were not compliant with the recent NYSE/NASDAQ board independence requirement than in firms that were compliant. We document that 74% of this magnitude is attributable to two outliers out of 865 sample firms. In addition, we find that the compensation committee independence requirement increases CEO total pay, particularly in the presence of effective shareholder monitoring. Our evidence casts doubt on the effectiveness of independent directors in constraining CEO pay as suggested by the managerial power hypothesis.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: Executive Compensation, CEO Pay, Managerial Power, Board Structure, Board Independence, Corporate Governance, Compensation Committee, Sarbanes-Oxley, NYSE, Nasdaq

JEL Classification: G34, G38, J31, J33

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Date posted: September 22, 2010 ; Last revised: June 8, 2012

Suggested Citation

Guthrie, Katherine and Sokolowsky, Jan and Wan, Kam-Ming, CEO Compensation and Board Structure Revisited (September 18, 2010). Journal of Finance, Vol. 67, No. 3, pp. 1149-1168, June 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1680476

Contact Information

Katherine Guthrie
College of William and Mary - Mason School of Business ( email )
P.O. Box 8795
Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795
United States
7572212832 (Phone)
Jan Sokolowsky (Contact Author)
Independent ( email )
Kam-Ming Wan
Hong Kong Polytechnic University ( email )
Hung Hom, Kowloon
Hong Kong
(852) 2766-7053 (Phone)
(852) 2330-9845 (Fax)
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