Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1684062
 
 

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Toward an Asymmetric Coase Theorem


Barbara Luppi


Università degli studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia (UNIMORE) - Faculty of Business and Economics; University of St. Thomas School of Law

Francesco Parisi


University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna

September 28, 2010

Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-55

Abstract:     
Various reformulations of the Coase theorem have developed normative corollaries on the choice of optimal remedies in the presence of positive transaction costs. In this article, we consider the extent to which these propositions are affected by the presence of asymmetric transaction costs, and we offer a reformulation of the Coase theorem which takes into account asymmetrical transaction costs. Our analysis combines several insights from the existing literature on property-type versus liability-type remedies, identifying the conditions for the superiority of each type of remedy. Further, we consider the possible use of mixed remedies and identify the optimal scope of such solution.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 16

Keywords: Coase Theorem, Property-Type Remedies, Liability-Type Remedies

JEL Classification: K10, K11, K19, D62, D70

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Date posted: September 28, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Luppi, Barbara and Parisi, Francesco, Toward an Asymmetric Coase Theorem (September 28, 2010). Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-55. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1684062 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1684062

Contact Information

Barbara Luppi
Università degli studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia (UNIMORE) - Faculty of Business and Economics ( email )
Viale Berengario 51
41100 Modena, Modena 41100
Italy
University of St. Thomas School of Law
MN
United States
Francesco Parisi (Contact Author)
University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
University of Bologna ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy
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