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Banks Versus Venture Capital When the Venture Capitalist Values Private Benefits of Control

Mehmet Barlo

Sabanci University

Eren Inci

Sabanci University

July 27, 2010

If control of their firms allows entrepreneurs to derive private benefits, it also allows other controlling parties. Private benefits are especially relevant for venture capitalists, who typically get considerable control in their portfolio firms, but not for banks, which are passive loan providers. We incorporate this difference between banks and venture capital and analyze entrepreneurs' financing strategy between the two. We find that, in all strict Nash Equilibria, entrepreneurs who value private benefits more choose banks while the rest choose venture capital. Thus, bank-financed entrepreneurs allocate more resources to tasks that yield private benefits while VC-backed entrepreneurs have higher profitability.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: bank, control, entrepreneurship, private benefit, venture capital

JEL Classification: G21, G24, G32, L26, M13

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Date posted: October 2, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Barlo, Mehmet and Inci, Eren, Banks Versus Venture Capital When the Venture Capitalist Values Private Benefits of Control (July 27, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1685173 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1685173

Contact Information

Mehmet Barlo
Sabanci University ( email )
Orta Mahalle Üniversite Caddesi 27
81474 Tuzla, Istanbul, 34956
Eren Inci (Contact Author)
Sabanci University ( email )
Orhanli-Tuzla, 34956 Istanbul
HOME PAGE: http://myweb.sabanciuniv.edu/ereninci/
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