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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1687307
 
 

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The Public Utility Pyramids


Paul G. Mahoney


University of Virginia School of Law

August 1, 2011

Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2010-09

Abstract:     
In the 1920s and 1930s, many public utilities in the United States were controlled by holding companies organized in pyramid form. This structure can add value to subsidiaries but can also facilitate extraction of wealth from the subsidiaries’ public shareholders. I examine the effects of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA), which outlawed pyramid structures. The value of both top holding companies and their subsidiaries fall (rise) around the time of key legislative events suggesting a higher (lower) likelihood that PUHCA would be enacted, supporting the hypothesis that public shareholders benefited from the presence of a controlling shareholder.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: Corporate Structure, Pyramids, Concentrated Ownership, Public Utilities

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Date posted: October 6, 2010 ; Last revised: September 8, 2011

Suggested Citation

Mahoney, Paul G., The Public Utility Pyramids (August 1, 2011). Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2010-09. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1687307 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1687307

Contact Information

Paul G. Mahoney (Contact Author)
University of Virginia School of Law ( email )
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
United States
434-924-7343 (Phone)
434-924-7536 (Fax)

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