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Communication, Correlation and Cheap-Talk in Games with Public InformationYuval HellerNuffield College - Department of Economics Eilon SolanTel Aviv University - School of Mathematical Sciences Tristan TomalaUniversité Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne October 13, 2010 Games and Economic Behavior, Forthcoming Abstract: This paper studies extensive form games with perfect information and simultaneous moves, henceforth called games with public information. On this class, we prove that all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained without mediator by cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 26 Keywords: cheap-talk, normal-form correlation, distributed computation Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: October 13, 2010 ; Last revised: September 30, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
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