Communication, Correlation and Cheap-Talk in Games with Public Information
Nuffield College - Department of Economics
Tel Aviv University - School of Mathematical Sciences
Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
October 13, 2010
Games and Economic Behavior, Forthcoming
This paper studies extensive form games with perfect information and simultaneous moves, henceforth called games with public information. On this class, we prove that all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained without mediator by cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 26
Keywords: cheap-talk, normal-form correlation, distributed computationAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: October 13, 2010 ; Last revised: September 30, 2011
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