Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1692437
 
 

References (28)



 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Inconsistency Pays?: Time-Inconsistent Subjects and EU Violators Earn More


Nathan Berg


University of Texas at Dallas - School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences

Catherine C. Eckel


Texas A&M University

Cathleen A. Johnson


University of Arizona - Department of Economics; Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO)

2008


Abstract:     
Experimental choice data from 881 subjects based on 40 time-tradeoff items and 32 risky choice items reveal that most subjects are time-inconsistent and most violate the axioms of expected utility theory. These inconsistencies cannot be explained by well-known theories of behavioral inconsistency, such as hyperbolic discounting and cumulative prospect theory. Aggregating expected payoffs and the risk associated with each subjects’ 72 choice items, the statistical links between inconsistency and total payoffs are reported. Time-inconsistent subjects and those who violate expected utility theory both earn substantially higher expected payoffs, and these positive associations survive largely undiminished when included together in total payoff regressions. Consistent subjects earn lower than average payoffs because most of them are consistently impatient or consistently risk averse. Positive payoffs from inconsistency cannot, however, be fully explained by greater risk taking. Controlling for the total risk of each subject’s risk choices as well as for socio-economic differences among subjects, time inconsistent subjects earn significantly more money, in statistical and economic terms. So do expected utility violators. Positive returns to inconsistency extend outside the domain in which inconsistencies occurs, with time-inconsistent subjects earning more on risky choice items, and expected utility violators earning more on time-tradeoff items. The results seem to call into question whether axioms of internal consistency – and violations of these axioms that behavioral economists frequently focus on – are economically relevant criteria for evaluating the quality of decision making in human populations.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

Keywords: behavioral economics, hyperbolic discounting, hypobolic, normative, coherence, correspondence, consistency, irrationality, rationality

JEL Classification: D03


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Date posted: October 15, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Berg, Nathan and Eckel, Catherine C. and Johnson, Cathleen A., Inconsistency Pays?: Time-Inconsistent Subjects and EU Violators Earn More (2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1692437 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1692437

Contact Information

Nathan Berg (Contact Author)
University of Texas at Dallas - School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences ( email )
P.O. Box 830688, GR 31
Richardson, TX 75083
United States
Catherine C. Eckel
Texas A&M University ( email )
5201 University Blvd.
College Station, TX 77843-4228
United States
Cathleen Amanda Johnson
University of Arizona - Department of Economics ( email )
McClelland Hall
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States
Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO) ( email )
2020 rue University, 25th Floor
Montreal, Quebec H3C 3J7
Canada
514-985-4000, ext. 3034 (Phone)
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References:  28
Citations:  2

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