Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1693343
 
 

Citations



 


 



Why Law, Economics, and Organization?


Oliver E. Williamson


University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

December 2005

Annual Review of Law and Social Science (2005), Vol. 1, pp. 369-396, 2005

Abstract:     
This review shows that a combined law, economics, and organization theory approach leads to different and deeper understandings of the purposes served by complex contract and economic organization. The business firm for these purposes is described not in technological terms (as a production function) but in organizational terms (as an alternative mode of governance). Firm and market are thus examined comparatively with respect to their capacities to organize transactions, which differ in their complexity, so as to economize on transaction costs. The predictive theory of economic organization that results has numerous ramifications for public policy toward business and for teaching and research in the law schools.

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: October 18, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Williamson, Oliver E., Why Law, Economics, and Organization? (December 2005). Annual Review of Law and Social Science (2005), Vol. 1, pp. 369-396, 2005. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1693343 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.1.031805.111122

Contact Information

Oliver E. Williamson (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group ( email )
545 Student Services Building
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-8697 (Phone)
510-642-4700 (Fax)
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