Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1694156
 
 

Footnotes (84)



 


 



The High Economic Costs of Cartels: Can Private Enforcement Help?


John M. Connor


Purdue University; American Antitrust Institute (AAI)

October 18, 2010


Abstract:     
This chapter examines anti-cartel enforcement in selected jurisdictions around the world, paying particular attention to the role of private court actions in attaining optimally deterring sanctions. The principal conclusions are as follows. There are numerous indicators that enforcement in North America comes closest to optimal deterrence of illegal cartel conduct. Monetary penalties are roughly commensurate with the economic injuries imposed on customers by price fixers. Since about 2000, the European Union – both the European Commission and its National Competition Authorities – have pulled ahead of North America in the size of fines imposed on cartels. While there are glimmers of change afoot, the EU's fight against cartel violators is hampered by court rules that severely limit the rights of cartel victims to seek compensation in private actions. Unlike the United States, EU law does not permit sanctions to be imposed on cartel managers, nor is this frequent in all but a few of its Member States. Cartel enforcement is weakest in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. There are a few rising stars on these continents, but government entities rarely see their efforts complemented by significant private settlements or damages awards to aggrieved cartel victims.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 19

Keywords: Cartel, international, collusion, price fixing, antitrust, optimal deterrence

JEL Classification: K21, K14, L41, L44, L65, L11, L13, N60

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: October 20, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Connor, John M., The High Economic Costs of Cartels: Can Private Enforcement Help? (October 18, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1694156 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1694156

Contact Information

John M. Connor (Contact Author)
Purdue University ( email )
610 Purdue Mall
West Lafayette, IN 47906
United States
+1 765-494-4600 (Phone)
American Antitrust Institute (AAI)
2919 Ellicott Street, N.W.
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20008-1022
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.antitrustinstitute.com
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 840
Downloads: 202
Download Rank: 87,673
Footnotes:  84
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.234 seconds