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Budgetary Participation: The Effects of Information Asymmetry, Goal Commitment, and Role Ambiguity on Job Satisfaction and Performance


Johnny Jermias


Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Beedie School of Business

October 19, 2010

CAAA Annual Conference 2011

Abstract:     
This study proposes a comprehensive model which empirically investigates the antecedent, mediating and outcome variables of budgetary participation. We propose that the information asymmetry between superiors and subordinates creates the need for budgetary participation. Accordingly, this study hypothesizes that the outcomes (i.e., job satisfaction and performance) of budgetary participation will be mediated by goal commitment and role ambiguity.

Based on a questionnaire survey of 194 middle level managers in Turkey, this study found that role ambiguity mediates the budgetary participation-job satisfaction and budgetary participation-performance relationships. The results are consistent with the view that the primary benefit of budgetary participation is to decrease role ambiguity, leading to more job satisfaction and better performance. Furthermore, we found that goal commitment mediates the budgetary participation-performance relationship. This result suggests that participation in the budgeting process increases goal commitment leading to better performance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

Keywords: Budgetary participation, information asymmetry, goal commitment, role ambiguity, job satisfaction, performance

JEL Classification: D21, G32, L1, M41

working papers series


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Date posted: October 22, 2010 ; Last revised: May 10, 2011

Suggested Citation

Jermias, Johnny, Budgetary Participation: The Effects of Information Asymmetry, Goal Commitment, and Role Ambiguity on Job Satisfaction and Performance (October 19, 2010). CAAA Annual Conference 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1694667 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1694667

Contact Information

Johnny Jermias (Contact Author)
Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Beedie School of Business ( email )
8888 University Drive
Burnaby, British Colombia V5A 1S6
Canada
604-291-4257 (Phone)
604-291-4920 (Fax)
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