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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1694924
 
 

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The Role of Fees in Patent Systems: Theory and Evidence


Gaétan De Rassenfosse


University of Melbourne

Bruno Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie


Free University of Brussels - Solvay Business School; Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

October 2, 2011

Journal of Economic Surveys, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
This paper reviews the economic literature on the role of fees in patent systems. Two main research questions are usually addressed: the impact of patent fees on the behavior of applicants and the question of optimal fees. Studies in the former group confirm that a range of fees affect the behavior of applicants and suggest that a patent is an inelastic good. Studies in the latter group provide grounds for both low and high application (or pre-grant) fees and renewal (or post-grant) fees, depending on the structural context and on policy objectives. The paper also presents new stylized facts on patent fees of thirty patent offices worldwide. It is shown that application fees are generally lower than renewal fees, and renewal fees increase more than proportionally with patent age.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: application fees, patent system, price elasticity, intellectual property policy, renewal fees

JEL Classification: O30, O31, O38, O57

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Date posted: October 20, 2010 ; Last revised: October 29, 2011

Suggested Citation

de Rassenfosse, Gaétan and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno, The Role of Fees in Patent Systems: Theory and Evidence (October 2, 2011). Journal of Economic Surveys, Forthcoming . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1694924 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1694924

Contact Information

Gaétan De Rassenfosse (Contact Author)
University of Melbourne ( email )
Level 5, 111 Barry Street
Parkville, Victoria 3010
Australia
HOME PAGE: http://www.gder.info
Bruno Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie
Free University of Brussels - Solvay Business School
50 Avenue Roosevelt
Brussels 1050
Belgium
Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA) ( email )
Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt 50
Brussels, B-1050
Belgium
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
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