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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1695047
 
 

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Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership from Control


Jill E. Fisch


Institute for Law and Economics, University of Pennsylvania Law School

2010

Seattle University Law Review, Vol. 33, p. 877, 2010
University of Pennsylvania, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 10-25

Abstract:     
The Modern Corporation and Private Property highlighted the evolving separation of ownership and control in the public corporation and the effects of that separation on the allocation of power within the corporation. This essay explores the implications of intermediation for those themes. The article observes that intermediation, by decoupling economic ownership and decision-making authority within the shareholder, creates a second layer of agency issues beyond those identified by Berle and Means. These agency issues are an important consideration in the current debate over shareholder empowerment.

The article concludes by considering the hypothetical shareholder construct implicit in the Berle and Means paradigm and in proposals to increase shareholder empowerment. Intermediation challenges the validity of this construct and raises questions about whether corporate law can rely on shareholders to constrain managerial power appropriately.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 13

Keywords: Corporations, Corporate Governance, Gorporate Finance, Capitalism, Adolf Berle, Gardiner Means, Shareholder Primacy, Intermediation Between Ownership and Control, Agency Theory, Agency Costs

JEL Classification: B25, B31, G34, K22

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Date posted: October 21, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Fisch, Jill E., Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership from Control (2010). Seattle University Law Review, Vol. 33, p. 877, 2010; University of Pennsylvania, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 10-25. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1695047

Contact Information

Jill E. Fisch (Contact Author)
Institute for Law and Economics, University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-746-3454 (Phone)
215-573-2025 (Fax)
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