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An Optional Instrument on EU Contract Law: Could it Increase Legal Certainty and Foster Cross-Border Trade?


Martijn W. Hesselink


University of Amsterdam - Centre for the Study of European Contract Law (CSECL)

October 12, 2010

HET GROENBOEK EUROPEES CONTRACTENRECHT: NAAR EEN OPTIONEEL INSTRUMENT?, pp. 9-23, M.W. Hesselink, A.A.H. van Hoek, M.B.M. Loos & A.F. Salomons, eds., Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2011
Centre for the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper No. 2010/06

Abstract:     
It seems likely that an optional instrument on European contract law could have some positive impact on cross-border trade, although its size remains very difficult to estimate. Whether an optional instrument will increase legal certainty depends on the degree to which the European legislator will succeed in making some very clear and transparent choices concerning scope, gap filling, mandatory rules, the modalities of opting in and the legal basis of the instrument.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: optional instrument, CFR, DCFR, contract, European contract law, opt-in, Rome I, Green paper, choice of law, mandatory rules, legal certainty

JEL Classification: F15, K12

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Date posted: October 23, 2010 ; Last revised: September 20, 2011

Suggested Citation

Hesselink, Martijn W., An Optional Instrument on EU Contract Law: Could it Increase Legal Certainty and Foster Cross-Border Trade? (October 12, 2010). HET GROENBOEK EUROPEES CONTRACTENRECHT: NAAR EEN OPTIONEEL INSTRUMENT?, pp. 9-23, M.W. Hesselink, A.A.H. van Hoek, M.B.M. Loos & A.F. Salomons, eds., Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2011 ; Centre for the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper No. 2010/06 . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1695617

Contact Information

Martijn W. Hesselink (Contact Author)
University of Amsterdam - Centre for the Study of European Contract Law (CSECL) ( email )
University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Law
P.O. Box 1030
Amsterdam, 1000 BA
Netherlands
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