Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1695666
 
 

References (33)



 
 

Citations (10)



 


 



Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable Challenge


Bo Becker


Swedish House of Finance

Daniel Bergstresser


Harvard Business School

Guhan Subramanian


Harvard Business School

January 19, 2012

Harvard Business School Finance Working Paper No. 11-052
Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No. 11-052
Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 685

Abstract:     
We use the Business Roundtable’s challenge to the SEC’s 2010 proxy access rule as a natural experiment to measure the value of shareholder proxy access. We find that firms that would have been most vulnerable to proxy access, as measured by institutional ownership and activist institutional ownership in particular, lost value on October 4, 2010, when the SEC unexpectedly announced that it would delay implementation of the Rule in response to the Business Roundtable challenge. We also examine intra-day returns and find that the value loss occurred just after the SEC’s announcement on October 4. We find similar results on July 22, 2011, when the D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of the Business Roundtable. These findings are consistent with the view that financial markets placed a positive value on shareholder access, as implemented in the SEC’s 2010 Rule.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: Shareholder proxy access, Corporate governance

JEL Classification: G14, G32, G34, G38

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Date posted: March 14, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Becker, Bo and Bergstresser, Daniel and Subramanian, Guhan, Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable Challenge (January 19, 2012). Harvard Business School Finance Working Paper No. 11-052; Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No. 11-052; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 685. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1695666 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1695666

Contact Information

Bo Becker
Swedish House of Finance ( email )
Drottninggatan 98
111 60 Stockholm
Sweden

Daniel B. Bergstresser (Contact Author)
Harvard Business School ( email )
Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States
Guhan Subramanian
Harvard Business School ( email )
Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-9784 (Phone)
617-496-7379 (Fax)
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