Kai A. Konrad
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
October 22, 2010
WZB Markets and Politics Working Paper No. SP II 2010-10
Considering several main types of dynamic contests (the race, the tug-of-war, elimination contests and iterated incumbency fights) we identify a common pattern: the discouragement effect. This effect explains why the sum of rentseeking efforts often falls considerably short of the prize that is at stake. It may cause violent conflict in early rounds, but may also lead to long periods of peaceful interaction.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 24
Keywords: Contest, dynamic conflict, discouragement effect, race, tug-of-war, elimination contest, iterated incumbency fight
JEL Classification: D71, D74working papers series
Date posted: October 25, 2010
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