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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1696512
 
 

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Excessive Pricing and the Goals of Competition Law - An Enforcement Perspective


Prof. Dr. Jörg Philipp Terhechte


Leuphana University Lüneburg, Competition & Regulation Institute

October 23, 2010

THE GOALS OF COMPETITION LAW, D. Zimmer, ed., Edward Elgar, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
The reanimated debate about the regulation or control of exploitative prices by competition authorities can demonstrate, inter alia, that the phenomenon of divergence of substantive standards and even of different goals of national and supranational competition or antitrust laws is often not about real divergence, but increasingly about felt divergence.I totally agree with the idea that the felt divergence between U.S. and European approaches in the field of excessive pricing could be overstated if one starts to broaden the perspective: Even in case a selected competition jurisdiction denies the necessity for a regulation of monopoly profits, as the U.S. does in principle, a deeper analysis of the whole regulatory environment of this jurisdiction will unearth a multitude of sectoral pricing rules which are in many cases not enforced by competition authorities, but by special regulatory agencies instead. Thus, trust in the market or the idea that excessive pricing might be self-correcting4 is restricted from the outset as many important markets all over the world are subject to special (price-) regulation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 12

Keywords: Exessive Pricing, Goals of Competition Law, Developing Countries, South Africa, Enforcement

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Date posted: October 23, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Terhechte, Prof. Dr. Jörg Philipp, Excessive Pricing and the Goals of Competition Law - An Enforcement Perspective (October 23, 2010). THE GOALS OF COMPETITION LAW, D. Zimmer, ed., Edward Elgar, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1696512

Contact Information

Prof. Dr. Jörg Philipp Terhechte (Contact Author)
Leuphana University Lüneburg, Competition & Regulation Institute ( email )
Scharnhorststraße 1
Lüneburg, 21335
Germany
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