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Social Norms and Economic Incentives in FirmsSteffen HuckUniversity College London - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Dorothea KüblerSocial Science Research Center (WZB); Technical University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics and Management; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Jorgen W. WeibullBoston University - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) IZA Discussion Paper No. 5264 Abstract: This paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We introduce a general framework to model social norms arguing that norms stem from agents’ desire for, or peer pressure towards, social efficiency. In a simple model of team production we examine the interplay of different types of contracts with social norms. We show that one and the same norm can be output-increasing, neutral, or output-decreasing depending on the incentive scheme. We also show how social norms can induce multiplicity of equilibria and how steeper economic incentives can reduce effort.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 28 Keywords: social norms, incentives, contracts JEL Classification: D23 working papers seriesDate posted: October 25, 2010Suggested CitationContact Information
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