Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1697872
 


 



Anticorruption Peer Review Mechanisms: What Pays-Off at the National Level


M. Florencia Guerzovich


Independent

October 20, 2010


Abstract:     
Anticorruption peer review mechanisms (PRMs) have become part of the international landscape. This note builds on the premise that PRMs are not perfectly efficient, but they are a relatively productive tool to buttress domestic anticorruption reforms. PRMs’ effectiveness is contingent on their ability to develop sub-state constituencies on an ongoing basis, so that useful international resources become a permanent part of domestic anticorruption governance. This insight sets the stage for a discussion about the strengths and weaknesses of concrete peer review mechanisms. Instead of starting with a model PRM in mind, and assessing the gap between the PRMs realities and ideals, stakeholders would do better to start with fewer assumptions, some questions, and real world data. Why and how peer reviews’ design features affect the willingness and ability of stakeholders to buy-into them and use their outputs in practice? The note builds on more than 300 in-depth interviews, including more than 50 current and former PRM experts, as well as reviews of primary documents and secondary works. It concludes with recommendations for anticorruption PRMs’ future.

Keywords: anticorruption, international standards, peer review mechanisms, GRECO, MESICIC

working papers series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: October 26, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Guerzovich, M. Florencia, Anticorruption Peer Review Mechanisms: What Pays-Off at the National Level (October 20, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1697872

Contact Information

Maria F. Guerzovich (Contact Author)
Independent ( email )
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