Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1697992
 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



'Because Everyone Thinks So': Hume on Authority and Common Opinion


Leslie Green


University of Oxford - Faculty of Law; Queen's University - Faculty of Law

October 1, 2010

Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 59/2010

Abstract:     
Many legal and political philosophers think that common attitudes to authority impose powerful constraints on justification. In particular, they often think sceptical theories are objectionably inconsistent with the common view that everyone has a duty to obey the law. The most influential argument of this sort is due to David Hume, and it is his version that is tested here. The paper argues that common opinion lacks is less probative than Hume thinks, and that his related objections to consent theory fail. There is no reason to think our common views of political authority are what Hume and others think they are. There is no reason to exempt widely-held common views about moral matters from scrutiny in light of the genesis of those views. There is reason to think that, in politics as in religion, what Hume called 'superstitions' are quite common.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: October 27, 2010 ; Last revised: June 11, 2012

Suggested Citation

Green, Leslie, 'Because Everyone Thinks So': Hume on Authority and Common Opinion (October 1, 2010). Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 59/2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1697992 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1697992

Contact Information

Leslie Green (Contact Author)
University of Oxford - Faculty of Law ( email )
Balliol College
Oxford
Oxford, UK, OX1 3BJ
United Kingdom
Queen's University - Faculty of Law ( email )
Kingston, Canada, Ontario K7L3N6
Canada
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,695
Downloads: 490
Download Rank: 31,464
Citations:  1

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.563 seconds