Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1698898
 
 

Citations (1)



 
 

Footnotes (61)



 


 



The Corporate Governance Provisions of Dodd-Frank


Stephen M. Bainbridge


University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law

October, 27 2010

UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 10-14

Abstract:     
This essay provides a brief overview of the seven principal corporate governance provisions of The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (better known as “The Dodd-Frank Act”).

1. Section 951 creates a so-called “say on pay” mandate, requiring periodic shareholder advisory votes on executive compensation.

2. Section 952 mandates that the compensation committees of reporting companies must be fully independent and that those committees be given certain specified oversight responsibilities.

3. Section 953 directs that the SEC require companies to provide additional disclosures with respect to executive compensation.

4. Section 954 expands Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s rules regarding clawbacks of executive compensation.

5. Section 971 affirms that the SEC has authority to promulgate a so-called “proxy access” rule pursuant to which shareholders would be allowed to use the company’s proxy statement to nominate candidates to the board of directors.

6. Section 972 requires that companies disclose whether the same person holds both the CEO and Chairman of the Board positions and why they either do or do not do so.

7. Section 989G affords small issuers an exemption from the internal controls auditor attestation requirement of Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 13

Keywords: corporate governance, Wall Street reform, Dodd-Frank, proxy access, say on pay, executive compensation, disclosure

JEL Classification: K22

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: October 28, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Bainbridge, Stephen M., The Corporate Governance Provisions of Dodd-Frank (October, 27 2010). UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 10-14. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1698898

Contact Information

Stephen Mark Bainbridge (Contact Author)
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )
385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States
310-206-1599 (Phone)
310-825-6023 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.professorbainbridge.com
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 5,378
Downloads: 1,122
Download Rank: 8,879
Citations:  1
Footnotes:  61

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 1.250 seconds