Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1700763
 
 

References (35)



 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Effects of Mergers in Two-Sided Markets: Examination of the U.S. Radio Industry


Przemyslaw Jeziorski


University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business

October 30, 2012


Abstract:     
This paper studies mergers in two-sided markets by estimating a structural supply-and-demand model using data from the 1996-2006 merger wave in U.S. radio. It makes two main contributions. First, it identifies the conflicting incentives of merged firms to exercise market power on both sides of the market (listeners and advertisers). Second, it disaggregates the effects of mergers into changes in product variety and changes in supplied ad quantity. I find that between 1996 and 2006 listener welfare increased by 0.2% ( 0.3% from extra variety, -0.1% from changes in ad quantity) and advertiser welfare decreased by 21% per-year (it is composed of 17% drop from variety changes, and extra 5% drop from ad quantity adjustments).

Number of Pages in PDF File: 58

Keywords: horizontal mergers, antitrust, two-sided markets, radio, advertising

JEL Classification: L82, L41, L13

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: November 1, 2010 ; Last revised: November 1, 2012

Suggested Citation

Jeziorski, Przemyslaw, Effects of Mergers in Two-Sided Markets: Examination of the U.S. Radio Industry (October 30, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1700763 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1700763

Contact Information

Przemyslaw Jeziorski (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )
545 Student Services Building
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 742
Downloads: 153
Download Rank: 108,066
References:  35
Citations:  2

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.391 seconds