Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1702293
 
 

Footnotes (78)



 


 



The Case for Iterative Statutory Reform: Appraisal and the Model Act


Robert B. Thompson


Georgetown University Law Center

November 3, 2010

Georgetown Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-20
Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 10-65

Abstract:     
Appraisal statutes providing minority shareholders a judicially-determined value for their shares may be the Model Business Corporation Act’s most distinctive and creative corporate law product. This article, part of a discussion marking the MBCA’s 60th anniversary, traces the somewhat tortured development of appraisal statutes from their traditional focus on providing dissenting shareholders liquidity in a broad variety of transactions to one focused on conflicted transactions initiated by majority shareholders. The historical liquidity function for appraisal, dating from the turn of the 20th century, simply no longer exists. Delaware, the other primary source for corporate statutes in the United States, continues to have an appraisal statute rooted in this now obsolete context; updating has been left mostly to the courts within ill-fitting statutory language. It took the Model Act drafters several iterations over a long period of years to fully transform their statute, but the result is a more coherent approach and an illustration of the relative advantages that can come from an iterative approach to statutory revision.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17

Keywords: appraisal, mergers, shareholder rights

JEL Classification: K00, K20, K22

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: November 4, 2010  

Suggested Citation

Thompson, Robert B., The Case for Iterative Statutory Reform: Appraisal and the Model Act (November 3, 2010). Georgetown Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-20; Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 10-65. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1702293

Contact Information

Robert B. Thompson (Contact Author)
Georgetown University Law Center ( email )
600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States
(202) 661-6591 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 520
Downloads: 59
Download Rank: 212,726
Footnotes:  78

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.469 seconds