Ending the Specialty Hospital Wars: A Plea for Pilot Programs as Information-Forcing Regulatory Design
Frank A. Pasquale III
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law; Yale University - Yale Information Society Project
November 3, 2010
THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS, pp. 235-277, Einer Elhauge, ed., Oxford University Press, 2010
Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper No. 2010-24
Over the last few decades, entrepreneurial doctors have tried to strip profitable business from general hospitals by opening physician-owned single-specialty hospitals. If these specialty hospitals are “cherrypicking” the healthiest Medicare patients and most lucrative DRGs, then reimbursements should be altered to better reflect the true cost of care. If they are eroding an infrastructure of emergency or indigent care, state authorities can tax them in order to directly subsidize these services. Pilot programs can help policymakers determine how substantial adjustments to payments and taxes should be.
Keywords: Specialty Hospital Wars, Entrepreneurial Doctors, Health Care, Cherrypicking, DRGs, PolicyAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: November 4, 2010 ; Last revised: November 7, 2010
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