Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1702546
 
 

References (33)



 
 

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Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance Around the World


Peter Iliev


Pennsylvania State University - Department of Finance

Karl V. Lins


University of Utah - Department of Finance

Darius P. Miller


Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Edwin L. Cox School of Business

Lukas Roth


University of Alberta - Department of Finance and Statistical Analysis

June 26, 2013

AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper

Abstract:     
We investigate whether the votes cast by U.S. institutional investors in elections for 8,160 non-U.S. firms across 43 countries are consistent with an effective shareholder voting process. We find that investor support for firms’ voting recommendations is lower when country-level investor protection is weak or firm-level managerial entrenchment is high, indicating that investors exercise dissent voting when they fear expropriation the most. Further, greater dissent voting is associated with greater director turnover and lower M&A deal completion rates, particularly in weak investor protection countries, indicating that shareholder votes impact firm policy. We conclude that shareholder voting is an effective channel through which corporate governance is exercised in firms across the world.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Voting, Insider Control, Shareholder Protection, Institutional Investors

JEL Classification: D7, F30, G15, G32, G34, K22

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Date posted: November 4, 2010 ; Last revised: July 17, 2013

Suggested Citation

Iliev, Peter and Lins, Karl V. and Miller, Darius P. and Roth, Lukas, Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance Around the World (June 26, 2013). AFA 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1702546 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1702546

Contact Information

Peter Iliev
Pennsylvania State University - Department of Finance ( email )
University Park, PA 16802
United States
Karl V. Lins (Contact Author)
University of Utah - Department of Finance ( email )
David Eccles School of Business
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
United States
801-585-3171 (Phone)
801-581-7214 (Fax)
Darius P. Miller
Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Edwin L. Cox School of Business ( email )
P.O. Box 750333
Dallas, TX 75275-0333
United States
Lukas Roth
University of Alberta - Department of Finance and Statistical Analysis ( email )
2-32C Business Building
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R6
Canada
780-492-4431 (Phone)
780-492-3325 (Fax)

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