Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance Around the World
Pennsylvania State University - Department of Finance
Karl V. Lins
University of Utah - Department of Finance
Darius P. Miller
Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Edwin L. Cox School of Business
University of Alberta - Department of Finance and Statistical Analysis
January 9, 2015
Review of Financial Studies, July 13, 2015, Volume 28, Issue 8
Using a sample of non-U.S. firms from 43 countries, we investigate whether laws and regulations as well as votes cast by U.S. institutional investors are consistent with an effective shareholder voting process. We find that laws and regulations allow for meaningful votes to be cast as shareholder voting is both mandatory and binding for important elections. For votes cast, we find there is greater dissent voting when investors fear expropriation. Further, greater dissent voting is associated with higher director turnover and more M&A withdrawals. Our results suggest that shareholder voting is an effective mechanism for exercising governance around the world.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 59
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Voting, Insider Control, Shareholder Protection, Institutional Investors
JEL Classification: D7, F30, G15, G32, G34, K22
Date posted: November 4, 2010 ; Last revised: November 18, 2015
© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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