Matching with Couples Revisited
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
University of Toronto
October 1, 2010
MIT Sloan Research Paper
It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a general class of large random markets the algorithm will nd a stable matching with high probability. In particular we allow the number of couples to grow at a near-linear rate. Furthermore, truth-telling is an approximated equilibrium in the game induced by the new matching algorithm. Our results are tight: for markets in which the number of couples grows at a linear rate, we show that with constant probability no stable matching exists.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 33
Keywords: Stability, Matching, Couples, Many-to-One, Algorithm
JEL Classification: C78, C63, C62, D78working papers series
Date posted: November 7, 2010 ; Last revised: December 1, 2010
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