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Can Preemption Protect Public Participation?


Adam Babich


Tulane University Law School

January 14, 2011

Case Western Reserve Law Review Symposium, 'Government Speech: The Government's Ability to Compel and Restrict Speech', November 19, 2010
NYLS Clinical Research Institute Paper No. 10/11 #11
Case Western Reserve Law Review, Vol. 61, No. 4

Abstract:     
This article argues that federal law would preempt state legislation to prevent law school clinics from helping clients participate in implementation of environmental laws. The article first discusses the role of public participation in the regulatory process. Next, it reviews the history of a 2010 legislative effort to de-lawyer the clients of the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic and shows that an effort to enact de-lawyering legislation is a disreputable tactic. Next, the article demonstrates that laws that would de-lawyer an environmental law clinic's clients would conflict with Congress’ mandate in environmental laws for enhanced public participation and would lack a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state purpose. The article then shows that attorney fees may be available to plaintiffs in preemption challenges to de-lawyering bills under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The article concludes that, in the context of environmental law, state de-lawyering laws are not only unwise, they are illegal under the Supremacy Clause.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 60

Keywords: Preemption, Clinics, Public Participation, Environmental Law, Administrative Law, Access to Justice

JEL Classification: K42

working papers series


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Date posted: November 9, 2010 ; Last revised: April 18, 2012

Suggested Citation

Babich, Adam, Can Preemption Protect Public Participation? (January 14, 2011). Case Western Reserve Law Review Symposium, 'Government Speech: The Government's Ability to Compel and Restrict Speech', November 19, 2010; NYLS Clinical Research Institute Paper No. 10/11 #11; Case Western Reserve Law Review, Vol. 61, No. 4. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1705377 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1705377

Contact Information

Adam Babich (Contact Author)
Tulane University Law School ( email )
6329 Freret Street
New Orleans, LA 70118
United States
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