Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1705753
 
 

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Theories of Harm in the Intel Case


Patrick DeGraba


Federal Trade Commission - Antitrust I

John David Simpson


The Brattle Group

November 8, 2010


Abstract:     
Over the past several years, government competition agencies and private plaintiffs have sued Intel challenging the legality of its relationships with original equipment computer manufacturers (“OEMs”). These lawsuits have combined to produce a detailed account describing Intel’s relationships with OEMs and analyzing the competitive effects of these relationships. This paper uses the public evidence in this account as a starting point for further analysis of both competition in downstream markets and the structure of Intel’s contracts with OEMs. By presenting this additional analysis, this paper seeks to better identify the circumstances under which exclusive contracts can lead to anticompetitive harm.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

Keywords: exclusive contracts

JEL Classification: K21, L12

working papers series


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Date posted: November 9, 2010  

Suggested Citation

DeGraba, Patrick and Simpson, John David, Theories of Harm in the Intel Case (November 8, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1705753 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1705753

Contact Information

Patrick DeGraba
Federal Trade Commission - Antitrust I ( email )
600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Rm. 4249
Washington, DC 20580
United States
202-326-2855 (Phone)
202-326-3443 (Fax)
John David Simpson (Contact Author)
The Brattle Group ( email )
1850 M Street, NW
Suite 1200
Washington, DC 20036
United States
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