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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1708412
 
 

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The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Decisions


Lee Epstein


Washington University in Saint Louis - School of Law

Tonja Jacobi


Northwestern University - School of Law

December 1, 2010

Annual Review of Law and Social Science, Vol. 6, pp. 341-358, 2010

Abstract:     
Since the 1990s, there has been an explosion of empirical and theoretical work dedicated to advancing strategic accounts of law and legal institutions. Reviewing this extensive literature could be accomplished in multiple ways. We chose an approach that underscores a major contribution of strategic accounts: that they have forced scholars to think about the interdependent - i.e., strategic - nature of judicial decisions. On strategic accounts, in other words, judges do not make decisions in a vacuum, but rather take into account the preferences and likely actions of other relevant actors, including their colleagues, their judicial superiors, and members of the other branches of government. After defining strategic analysis and how it differs from other approaches to judicial decisions, we examine the literature on the forms of strategic behavior in which (preference-maximizing) judges engage when interacting with these three sets of actors.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

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Date posted: November 14, 2010 ; Last revised: November 20, 2010

Suggested Citation

Epstein, Lee and Jacobi, Tonja, The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Decisions (December 1, 2010). Annual Review of Law and Social Science, Vol. 6, pp. 341-358, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1708412 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-102209-152921

Contact Information

Lee Epstein (Contact Author)
Washington University in Saint Louis - School of Law ( email )
Campus Box 1120
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States
HOME PAGE: http://epstein.wustl.edu
Tonja Jacobi
Northwestern University - School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Unit 1505
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
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